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F OR THE LAST TWO YEARS

it has been the objective of the
Villanova Law Review's Annual Symposium to bring together
representatives of the press and the bar for a freewheeling examination of a problem of mutual concern. Last year the focus of the
program was on problems of A Free Press and A Fair Trial;' this
year, on the implication of the recent cases of New York Times v.
Sullivan2 and Time, Inc. v. Hill' on the law of defamation, privacy,
and the constitutional right of a free press.
Our procedure this year, as last, was to invite distinguished exponents of varying views to deliver short papers which served as a
basis for discussion. In order to preserve an atmosphere of informality and out-spoken criticism we have made no attempt to transcribe the entire proceedings, but we hope that the presentation of
these papers, although they make no pretense of being exhaustive, will
further stimulate the interchange of ideas and opinions which were
found so valuable at the Symposium.
We have not asked those who presented these papers to expand
them for publication, but in light of recent Supreme Court holdings

in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,4
which were handed down several weeks after the Symposium, certain
minor modifications either in the text of the papers or by way of
addendum have been made.
It was my privilege to act as moderator for both this year's and
last year's Symposium. The role of the moderator is to moderate, not
t Professor of Law, Villanova University.
LL.B., 1954.
1. 11 VILL. L. Rv. 677-741 (1966).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
4. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).

A.B., Harvard University, 1951,
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to dictate; so I again find myself in the unusual role of a listener rather
than a speaker. The opportunity to write a brief introduction to these
papers will not be taken to redress the balance. I shall limit my observations to those aspects of the papers which I found most significant
and a few words about the post-Symposium developments in the
Supreme Court.
Professor Nelson, a teacher of would-be journalists and a wise
observer of the working press, presents no rosy picture of the press as
constantly endeavoring at 'the highest level of professional responsibility to advance the great freedom of the press and the public's right
to know. He is well aware that from time to time newspaper men,
like lawyers, abuse their privilege and overstep the limits of their freedom. But he is justly concerned whether or not a working member
of the press can know what these limits are.
The law of defamation was filled with subtleties w.hich would confound lawyers and judges to say nothing of editors and reporters. The
newsman was plagued not only by the eternal question of 'what is
truth, but the enigmatic problem of what is opinion, what is fact,
and such questions as what is fair comment, what is malice - real,
constructive or implied - what are the differences between the law
of New York and Pennsylvania? Out of this briar patch of problems
Professor Nelson sees emerging from New York Times v. Sullivan, a
simpler, more easily understood limit on what the press can and cannot do -

the requirement of actual malice in order to find liability.

Obviously this rule, like its predecessors, cannot be automatically
applied, but it is relatively narrower than the former rules and has
the advantage of being national in scope. Whether or not the concept of recklessness 'will produce a new series of conflicting standards
and modifications so as to dispell the dream of comparative order and

peace advanced by Professor Nelson is a very open question. The
recent development of a variant on the New York Times rule for "public
figures," suggested by the majority in the Butts case, ' indicates the
kind of problem that may still be ahead of us.
One further observation on Professor Nelson's presentation may
be in order. Although the briar patch of the law of defamation was
confusing, this confusion was by no means always to the detriment
of the press. It may well be that the very intricacy of the law was
one of the -chief advantages of the press in such actions and that there
were some very clever rabbits in the briar patch. If the reporters were
confused, so often were the plaintiffs, and defense counsel, experienced
and wise in the intricacies of the law, often won the day. Long before
5. See Id. at 1991.
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New York Times the press seemed to be doing very well in staving
off the destruction threatened by libel actions. In fact many observers
noted ,that it was the rare plaintiff who prevailed.'
It is perhaps not surprising that the quality and' success of the
defenses available to the press were not stressed by one of the most
eminent members of the defense bar, Mr. Arthur Hanson, General
Counsel of the American Newspaper Publishers Associations. Clearly
the New York Times rule may not only mean that newspapers will continue to prevail in such actions, but that discouraged plaintiffs will not
even enter the list at all, and no newspaper's lawyer is going to take the
position that it is better to be sued and win than never to be sued at all.
Although Mr. Hanson recognizes the fact that newspapers can
go -too far, he is quite naturally loathe to circumscribe the press for
any more than the most blatant abuses. Mr. Hanson holds that some
damage to individuals may be the not too excessive cost of a vital
press and the public's right to know. Those who put themselves in the
public eye must "assume the risk" of being hurt by the comment and
criticism of the press. To a large extent Mr. Hanson's view seems to
strike a responsive cord with most, if not all, members of the Supreme
Court, and especially with the civil libertarians, Justices Black and
Douglas, who would go even further than Mr. Hanson in granting
the press immunity. Yet it 'is strange that this doctrine should gain
such wide support in a legal world that has largely rejected the concept that an injured worker should be denied compensation for the
good of industry, that 'the damages of an injured seaman should be
limited by the needs of maintaining a maritime fleet, or that the
liberty of an individual can be sacrificed to the general need of a society
to feel secure against crime or against subversion. The current trend
of the law has been toward the idea that it is society as a whole that
should bear the burden for societal benefits, not that the unlucky
individual 'who has suffered damage should be without recourse, and
the rights of an individual are not to be abridged because of the competing claims of larger conglomerations of power - 'the government,
industry, or, one might have thought, the press.
Mr. Green, a lawyer for plaintiffs in this type of action, was keenly
aware, quite naturally, of the losses suffered by individuals in the
name of abstract principles such as freedom of the press and the public's
right to know. He asked whether the advantage of the circulation of
negligent falsehoods to the public is so great that a man can be told
that the loss of his job, reputation, 'his possibilities of success in life,
6. Green, Regenerative Process In Law, 33 IND. L.J. 166, 173-76 (1958),

in

GRJEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 106-09 (1965).
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can all be shunted off as non-compensable. Posing the question in this
fashion, indicates the poignant situation of the loser in the battles
against the press, 'but one wonders whether or not many more plaintiffs
will in fact lose under the new rules than under the old. May not
"reckless disregard" be in the long run as secure a reed as lack of
fair comment? The effect of the New York Times case may 'be only
to indicate more clearly to would-be plaintiffs the limitations to their
possibility of success; limits which may have existed even under the
prior law. May not the New York Times and Butts cases prove more
significant as establishing an underlying constitutional framework
from which other techniques of correcting gross abuses which imperil
the press may be more easily fashioned. Once the broad constitutional
groundwork has been laid, the Court may find it more feasible to strike
down verdicts by juries wh'ich are prejudicial or which are so excessive that they imperil the life of a newspaper. Mr. Justice Harlan in
7
Butts clearly suggests that this road is open to the Court.

One aspect of ,the problem of restricting actions against newspapers which has not 'been acknowledged 'by the Court is the possibility
that the law suit itself is an instrument of free speech. The action
against the newspaper is newsworthy and facts which come out in
such actions may well advance the cause of free exchange of ideas by
giving dissenters not only their day in court, 'but their day in the sun.
Lastly, where do we go from Butts? The Supreme Court has
made it clear, as all the participants in the Symposium anticipated,
that the New York Times rule would not be limited to public officials.
Apparently, the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and White would
apply the New York Times rule to public figures. Justices Black and
Douglas, although dissatisfied with the New York Times rule, would
certainly not support a more permissive plaintiff's rule, but Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and Fortas would -in the case of public figures ('though
not public officials and apparently not in privacy actions) support a
lesser rule of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extensive
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers."' In the opinion of these justices
the publication of false statements under such circumstances could be
the basis of a libel action even though it did not amount to "recklessness" under the New York Times rule. Although this view was incorporated -in the majority's opinion in Butts, it does not seem to be
the view of the majority of the present Court.
The majority of the Court, however, does seem to adhere to the
view that it is appropriate to make a distinction between "hot" news,
7. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975, 1994 (1967).
8. Id. at 1991. (Emphasis added.)
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such as -in Walker, and feature muck-raking, such as in Butts, in
order to determine whether or not a publication is reckless. The
acceptance of this distinction indicates that the concept of recklessness
is not one of intent or animus, but rather of extreme carelessness.
This in turn would 'suggest that -in fact the standards of investigation
and reporting adhered to by responsible publishers should be relevant
not as a modification of the New York Times doctrine for public
figures, but as a consideration in any case:in which the New York
Times rule is applicable.
The Court was split on whether, in the light of its newly enunciated
standards, -the evidence and instructions in the Butts case were sufficient to find libel. Although this question is of considerable interest as
an aspect of the problem of judicial review, and the effect of new
constitutional doctrine in the cases in which they are developed, the
resolution should not be significant in the development of the new
rules. It is clear that although the instructions and evidence in the
Butts case were held sufficient so as not to necessitate a new trial, the
actual instructions in Butts would be inadequate in any future cases.
It could not be said that even the majority, which was satisfied that
Butts should not be retried, in any way 'adopted the notions of recklessness that were developed by the lower courts in that case. A conservative trial judge in all cases -involving public figures would find it
necessary to give instructions based on the New York Times rule and
further instruct that the jury should consider whether the publication involved "hot news" or not, and might even go so far as to
suggest to the jury that they consider professional standards in determining recklessness.
Notwithstanding the fact that there was no discussion of them in
Butts, some of the more interesting questions that remain to be considered are what is a "public figure" and what is a matter "of public
concern." The Court has not indicated any limits on these concepts,
but it may be safely hazarded that the Court will not read them restrictively and that few plaintiffs will succeed in avoiding the application
of the New York Times rule. The Court, therefore, has fashioned
a new law of libel for the press, and although the sweep of the New
York Times rule is very wide, and many old distinctions and problems
have been outstripped in the process, many new problems lay ahead.
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